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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
ROBERT P. HAGEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
Category No. 13 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Respondent does not disagree with the issues 
presented in the petition filed by the state. 
OPINION BELOW 
Respondent does not disagree with the citation to 
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the petition filed by 
the state. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Respondent does not disagree with the statement of 
jurisdiction in the petition filed by the state. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONSr STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory or 
rule provisions pertinent to the questions presented for 
review is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent does not disagree with the statement of 
the case presented in the state's petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REACH A DECISION CONTRARY 
TO UTE INDIAN TRIBE V, STATE OF UTAH , 773 F.2D 
1087 (10th CIR. 1985) (EN BANC), CERT. DENIED, 
479 U.S. 994 (1986). 
In its petition, the state asserts that the Court 
of Appeals erroneously concluded that this court could not 
reach a decision contrary to Ute Indian Tribe , Supra. Its 
rationale was based on State v. Janis , 317 N.W.2d 133 
(S.D. 1982) and Stankey v. Waddell , 256 N.W.2d 117 (S.D. 
1977). The Supreme Court of South Dakota had reached a 
different result in those cases than the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on whether a reservation had been 
disestablished. Solem v. Bartlett , 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
Since the power to establish and disestablish a 
reservation is with the United States Congress, a 
determination of the boundary is a federal law question. 
Solem , supra. While the pronouncement on a federal law 
question by an inferior federal court is not necessarily 
binding on a state court, it is highly persuasive. 
Phillips v. Williams , 603 P.2d 1131 (Okl. 1980). There are 
practical advantages which cannot be ignored when federal 
and state courts adopt the same interpretation of federal 
law. Van De Hey v. United States National Bank of Oregon , 
793 P.2d 1388 (C.A. Ore. 1990). 
After extensive litigation in the federal court 
system, the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ute 
Indian Tribe , supra, determined the exterior boundaries of 
the Uintah Reservation to include Myton. The State of Utah 
2 
was a party in Ute Indian Tribe as in this case. The 
state should be collaterally estopped from relitigating the 
issue of the boundary of the Uintah Reservation. Madsen v. 
Borthick , 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). Collateral estoppel 
precludes relitigation of an issue tried in a prior action. 
Nielson v. Doubray , 652 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). It is not 
necessary that the party who asserts collateral estoppel 
have been a party in the first action. Robertson v. 
Campbell , 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Mutuality of parties 
is not required. Nielson , supra. Federal Court judgments 
are entitled to recognition in state courts. 46 Am Jur 2d 
Judgments Section 448. 47 Am Jur 2d Judgments Section 
1291. Because the State of Utah was a party in Ute Indian 
Tribe , supra, and lost it should be estopped from 
relitigating the boundary issue. 
In Ute Indian Tribe , the court cited Solem
 f 
supra, and stated there were two situations where courts 
could find that congress intended to disestablish an Indian 
reservation. 
only in two types of situations should courts find 
that Congress intended to disestablish an Indian 
reservation. The first of these is when Congress 
uses explicit language of cession in an opening 
act and also gives indication of an unconditional 
commitment to compensate Indians for their opened 
lands. 102 S.CT. at 1166. The other situation is 
"when events surrounding the passage of a surplus 
land act—particularly the manner in which the 
transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved 
and the tenor of legislative reports presented to 
Congress-unequivocally reveal a widely-held, 
contemporaneous understanding that the affected 
reservation would shrink as a result of the 
proposed legislation...." 
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The court found that neither situation existed regarding the 
Uintah Indian Reservation, the reservation at issue here. 
Regarding diminishment of reservation lands, the 
court in Solem , supra, stated 
When both an act and its legislative history fail 
to provide substantial and compelling evidence 
of a congression intention to diminish Indian 
lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude 
for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment 
did not take place and that the old reservation 
boundaries survived the opening. 
The state in its petition urges this court to grant 
certiorai because the question of the boundary of the Uintah 
Indian Reservation should be settled by this court. If this 
court were to determine that the boundary of the Uintah 
Indian Reservation was different than the boundary 
determined by the 10th Circuit in Ute Indian Tribe , supra, 
then the matter would not be settled. The conflict in 
opinions would eventually have to be settled by the United 
States Supreme Court. Respondent submits that Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure does not require that the 
boundary of the Uintah Indian Reservation should be decided 
by this court. 
II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN REFUSING TO 
REMAND RESPONDENT'S CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTION. 
In its petition, the state argues that the Court of 
Appeals should have remanded respondent's case back to the 
trial court for a reconsideration of the jurisidictional 
A 
issue. In support of its position, the state cites State 
v. Miller , 547 N.E.2d 399 (Ohio App. 1988), State v. Russo 
, 233 N.W.2d 485 (Wis. 1974) and State v. Love , 625 P.2d 7 
(Kan. 1981). These cases are all distinguishable from the 
instant case. In each of the cases, a defendant was charged 
with a crime by a charging document which was defective. 
Each of the cases proceeded to trial. At varying stages 
thereafter, the charges were dismissed and new charges 
filed. Counsel for the defendants argued that double 
jeopardy prevented further proceedings. The court in 
Miller , s 
upra, stated the general rule as follows: 
In the absence of a sufficient formal accusation, 
a court acquires no jurisdiction whatever, and 
if it assumes jurisdiction, a trial and conviction 
are a nullity. 
Because of the defective charging documents, all 
three courts ruled that the initial courts which tried the 
defendants did not have jurisdiction and so jeopardy did not 
attach. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals 
determined that the state had failed to offer sufficient 
evidentiary proof regarding the jurisdiction of the District 
Court. The Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that 
the state was not entitled to a second chance to put on 
evidence addressing the jurisdiction issue and that the 
defendant should be discharged. 
The general rule is that jeopardy attaches upon the 
acceptance of a guilty plea by the court. State v. Teves , 
670 P.2d 834 (Haw. App.1983). The double jeopardy clause 
forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the 
prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it 
failed to muster in the first proceeding. Burks v. U.S. , 
437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
In Burks , the defendant was convicted of bank 
robbery despite his insanity defense. The Court of Appeals 
held, based on the testimony regarding the sanity of the 
defendant, that the trial court should have granted the 
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The Court of 
Appeals then ruled that the case should be remanded to the 
District Court to choose the appropriate course from a 
balancing of the equities. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally 
insufficient, the only just remedy available for that court 
is the direction of a judgment of acquittal. 
The court in State v. Sorenson , 758 P.2d 466 (UT. 
App. 1988) held that jurisdiction must be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. U.C. Section 76-1-201 and 
76-1-501(3). In that case, because the state failed to 
prove jurisdiction, the court reversed the conviction and 
ordered the discharge of the defendant. See also State v. 
Losolla , 500 P.2d 436 (N.M. 1972). 
The Court of Appeals was correct in its 
determination that the state should not have a second chance 
to offer evidentiary proof in this matter. 
This issue should not be settled by this court 
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under Rule 46 of the Ute Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this day of March, 1991. 
Joel D. Berrett 
Attorney for Respondent 
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